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The Gender and Generational Consequences of the Demographic Transition
and Population Policy: An Assessment of the Micro and Macro Linkages
T. Paul Schultz
Abstract
The demographic transition changes the age composition of a population, affecting resource
allocations at the household and aggregate level.  If age profiles of income, consumption,
savings and investments were stable and estimable for the entire population, they might suggest
how the demographic transition would affect inputs to growth.  However, existing macro and
micro simulations are estimated from unrepresentative samples of wage earners that do not
distinguish sex, schooling, etc.  The “demographic dividend” is better evaluated through case
studies of household surveys and long-run social experiments.  Matlab, Bangladesh, extended a
family planning and maternal and child health program to half the villages in its district in 1977,
and recorded fertility in the program villages was 16 percent lower than in control villages for
the following two decades until 1996.  Households in program villages realized health and
productivity gains that were concentrated among women, while child survival and schooling
increased, and household physical assets were 25 percent greater per adult than in control
villages.
Keywords: Fertility decline, demographic transition, intergenerational transfers, gender
JEL codes: J13, J21, J68, O15
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Several decades into a country’s demographic transition, once its crude birth rate 
starts to decline steadily, the ratio of children (ages 0–14) to adults (ages 15–59) declines, 
and for several more decades this decline in the youth ratio more than offsets the slow 
increase in the ratio of elderly (ages 60 and older) to adults. This intermediate stage in the 
demographic transition is associated with a temporary increase in the share of adults in 
the population that is referred to as the “demographic dividend.” How does this change in 
the age composition of a population affect economic growth and the distribution of 
income by age and gender?  
This paper considers links proposed between the demographic transition and 
economic development that are sometimes assumed to operate through changes in the age 
composition of national populations. The demographic dividend literature emphasizes a 
period of high aggregate savings following the decline in fertility, but of potentially equal 
importance are the consequences for women’s productivity and labor supply and the 
health of women who avoid unwanted childbearing. These life cycle substitutions of 
family resources from childbearing activities to labor market activities may be facilitated 
by microcredit and labor market policies that ease the reallocation of women’s time and 
bring family planning and reproductive health programs within reach of relatively 
immobile women in rural South Asia. Such policies can reduce the gaps between the 
health and schooling of men and women and boost investment, economic growth, and 
labor force participation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section I discusses the difficulty of reconciling 
the large aggregate estimates of life cycle savings effects and the small and insignificant 
micro estimates of age composition effects on household savings. Sections II and III 
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review micro and macro simulation studies that concentrate on the expected 
consequences of changes in the age composition of the population and suggest their 
limitations due to omitted variable bias and misspecified production relationships at the 
individual and aggregate levels. Section IV considers the empirical evidence from a long-
run social experiment in Matlab Thana, Bangladesh, suggesting how a village-level 
family planning program helped to reduce fertility and contributes to the reallocation of 
family resources. The program has spurred the labor productivity of married women, 
increased child survival, improved the nutritional health of women and daughters, 
increased the schooling of children, and added to the accumulation of physical capital, all 
consequences of the demographic transition that should accelerate development. 
Although it is only a single study (long-term social experiments with family planning and 
family health are rare), Matlab suggests that changes in the age composition of the 
population and the slowing of population growth are not the key mechanisms that 
translate the demographic transition into economic growth. Section V and VI draw on the 
record from Matlab to suggest that the policy challenge is to find ways to assist women in 
using effective family planning and then to design labor and credit market policies for 
mothers who, with fewer children, will want to reallocate their time and family resources 
to improve their economic opportunities and to facilitate investments in the health, 
schooling, and migration of their children. Section VII discusses some directions for 
research. 
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I.   LIFE CYCLE SAVINGS EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH AGE COMPOSITION  
It is reasonable to imagine that changes in the age composition of a population, 
other things equal, should affect household demand for physical assets and human capital 
and thus influence life cycle savings and asset prices.  The portfolio of assets held by 
households might also change if assets complement the endowments of households that 
vary systematically over their life cycle, such as the labor of children.  
Data for the United States and several other high-income countries have shown 
that the elderly do not dissave at the rate implied by the pure life cycle savings model 
(Poterba 1994, 2004; Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 2001). To maintain the core of 
the life cycle savings hypothesis, economists introduce other motivations for savings, 
such as precautionary savings (wealth as insurance against unpredictable end-of-life 
expenditures and health crises) and a dynastic family consumption objective (the elderly 
are assumed to want to make bequests). Modigliani and Brumburg (1954) consider only 
adult consumption without reference to families or children. A third complication might 
arise if longer lifespans and longer retirement periods affected savings (Sheshinski 2006). 
Although these three extensions of the life cycle savings model do not imply identical 
predictions, they are difficult to distinguish empirically from each other, as the life cycle 
becomes more multifaceted. Poterba (1994, 2004) reviews this literature and examines 
the empirical evidence, finding no close relationships between the age composition 
changes from 1950 to 2000 and financial market outcomes in the United States or 
convincing evidence from other countries or cross-country comparisons. 
Most of the limited number of studies of low-income countries have problems 
establishing the magnitude of empirical relationships between age and income and 
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savings at the household level or even across countries. Only in the 1990s do cross-
country regressions begin to suggest that more rapid population growth and youthful age 
compositions are associated with lower physical savings rates and slower economic 
growth (Kelley and Schmidt 1996). This may be due to the inclusion for the first time of 
African countries, and many other factors could explain their slow growth, including 
political institutions, health crises, and civil conflict. Aggregate evidence across Asian 
countries reveals an association between savings rates and age composition, allowing for 
country fixed effects, but only if current savings is a function of lagged savings, and this 
lagged dependent variable is implausibly treated as though it were exogenous (Higgins 
and Williamson 1997). Whether the trends in declining mortality and fertility are causing 
the increased savings and economic growth within this sample of countries remains 
controversial (Deaton and Paxson 2000). When the lagged savings rate is treated as 
endogenous within countries and estimated using the authors’ own list of instruments, the 
estimated age composition effects on savings collapses and ceases to be significantly 
different from zero (Higgins and Williamson 1997). 
There is no consensus on how to reconcile the larger aggregate estimates of the 
magnitude of life cycle savings effects (Kelley and Schmidt 1996; Higgins and 
Williamson 1997) and the smaller and insignificant micro estimates of age composition 
effects on savings based on household surveys (Poterba 1994, 2004; Deaton and Paxson 
1997, 2000).  
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II.   MICRO SIMULATION OF THE AGGREGATE EFFECTS OF AGING ON SAVINGS,               
TRANSFERS, AND GROWTH 
Mason and others (2008) propose simplifying assumptions that permit them to 
impute production and consumption to individuals by age, based primarily on data from 
the United States and Taiwan, China. Given their age accounting system, which does not 
involve economic behavior in the form of human capital investment or labor supply, and 
ignores entirely gender and schooling, an individual’s age profile of savings leads to 
wealth accumulation and intergenerational private and public transfers by age. Household 
surveys are used initially to measure average earnings across age groups for all wage 
earners, and these synthetic age profiles of earnings are then adjusted proportionately to 
sum to national totals for wage income in the aggregate National Income and Product 
Accounts (NIPA). This imputation procedure assumes that all adults who are employed 
in the labor force (wage earners, self employed, and unpaid family workers) work the 
same amount of time and contribute equally to national income regardless of gender or 
schooling, subject to the nonwage worker fitted income adjustment to the NIPA total. 
Consumption is allocated by a variety of rules, many of which are country-specific or 
imputed by arbitrary age-sex equivalence scales (Browning, 1992). 
What are the conceptual problems with this methodology? Demographic 
outcomes that differ substantially by age in part due to biological factors, such as 
mortality or fertility, are forecasted as a function of changing age compositions. But 
when this approach is applied to income and consumption, transfers must occur between 
age groups that are then required to balance out surpluses in production minus 
consumption. These transfers may be financed in the private sector, within families or by 
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charitable or religious welfare institutions, or in the public sector, notably through 
transfers to youth for schooling and to the elderly for health care and pensions. The 
problem in using this fixed age-matrix of economic outcomes for projecting income, 
consumption, savings, and transfers is that there is no behavioral or institutional 
mechanism hypothesized to equilibrate the consumption surpluses and deficits, balance 
the aggregate budget in each time period, or shift resources intertemporally, because 
there is no behavioral model for family formation, fertility, labor supply, human capital 
investments in children, consumption, savings, asset pricing, and wealth accumulation for 
retirement and bequests. The specific problems with this demographic simulation 
approach that relies on age profiles without a behavioral model should be obvious. 
III.    LIFE CYCLE SAVINGS AND THEIR EFFECTS ON COUNTRIES 
Models of behavior that are important for answering macroeconomic questions 
are sometimes hard to estimate with confidence from basic microeconomic data on 
individuals and households. One such case is the life cycle saving hypothesis, in which 
consumption behavior in aggregate time series among countries is thought to be affected 
by age composition (Ando and Modigliani 1963; Modigliani 1970). Efforts to confirm 
the theory at the micro or household level have led to ambiguous empirical results.  
Ideally, income and consumption would be observed for all individuals in a 
sample survey or census in order to compare savings rates by age and replicate the 
pattern with lifetime wealth data where savings and transfers can be measured to include 
capital gains and changes in stocks of consumer durables. Empirical problems arise 
because consumption is generally pooled and measured at the household level, and 
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attribution of consumption by age restricts the analysis to single-person households, 
which constitute a small and unrepresentative subset of the population, especially among 
the young and old. This is a more serious problem in low-income countries, where a 
larger proportion of the population resides in intergenerational households headed by 
working parents or adult children and where self-employment is more common. Adult 
equivalence scales for consumption “requirements” of household members by age and 
sex are an unavoidable administrative tool for setting poverty lines and comparing 
welfare across households that are demographically and economically heterogeneous, but 
these scales should not be interpreted as derived from a conventional model of individual 
or household behavior (Browning 1992).  
Those who work for pay in the market labor force are a selected sample. The 
number of hours they decide to work and contribute to household market income is also 
an endogenous decision that is determined by individual preferences that affect 
household composition. When savings rates are calculated for the elderly who remain the 
heads of their households, their savings is often positive and wealth continues to increase 
on average. An exception is the present discounted value of social security pensions or 
other annuities, which by definition decline with age unless augmented by other sources 
(Poterba 2004).  
Intergenerational transfers are ignored in the pure life cycle savings model and 
complicate the interpretation of age-wealth profiles. Modigliani suggests that 
intergenerational transfers are not important for understanding private wealth holdings. 
But Kotlikoff and Summers (1988) cite studies of transfers and bequests between living 
people in the United States and other high-income countries that conclude that transfers 
9    
are a substantial factor in age profiles of wealth (Bernheim, Skinner, and Weinberg 
2001). Bequest motives within families offer the best available explanation for why so 
few elderly dissave or rely on annuity insurance to supplement life cycle savings in the 
face of an uncertain and increasing life span (Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981). The expected 
magnitude of life cycle savings is reduced when overlapping-generation models allow for 
intergenerational altruism and bequest motives to affect savings. The magnitude of 
savings that is then residually attributed to life cycle consumption smoothing is modest, 
and this may be the most plausible explanation for the failure of microeconomic evidence 
to show much variation in household savings rates over the life cycle (Poterba 2004). 
Household surveys from low-income countries are generally less well designed to 
document individual income by age and sex than are surveys in high-income countries. 
Given the fragile empirical basis and limited theoretical implications of more general life 
cycle models, there is reason to view these frameworks as currently an unreliable 
forecasting tool. 
Because of these shortcomings of cross-country regressions on changes in age 
composition, and the inadequacy of micro simulations built on rudimentary age profiles 
of wages or savings for assessing the “demographic dividend,” more microeconometric 
analyses of household surveys and case studies are needed that define a counterfactual 
and explain how health and family planning programs affect the timing of the 
demographic transition and might thereby modify the behavior and development of 
families.  
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IV.    A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT IN MATLAB, BANGLADESH, AND ITS EFFECTS 
To estimate the causal effects of changes in the age composition of a population, 
it is necessary to specify factors that change mortality and fertility and thus affect the 
path of the demographic transition but do not otherwise affect the behavior or outcomes 
of interest. The approaches outlined in the previous sections do not identify an exogenous 
source of variation in fertility or mortality driving the demographic transition. They 
implicitly assume, therefore, that birth and death rates are determined outside the model 
and that any observed association between birth and death rates and economic change is 
therefore an indication of a causal relationship operating in a single direction from the 
demographic transition to development. Those working assumptions are not tenable. 
Fertility and to some degree mortality respond to individual preferences and to 
household economic resources, as well as to other preconditions that affect economic 
development in many ways, such as institutions that raise the returns to investment and 
stimulate savings, increase women’s education, and reduce fertility. Only when an 
exogenous shock occurs that reduces fertility can it be confidently inferred that 
subsequent changes can be attributable to the decline in fertility. To ensure this 
independence between population policies and fertility change and economic 
development, the policy intervention should be designed as a social experiment. The goal 
is to show first that the population receiving the policy intervention has the expected 
lower fertility and slower population growth. Then, this program-associated voluntary 
reduction in births can be related to parent reallocation of time and resources from 
bearing children to other life cycle activities that substitute for child labor and child 
support and care for their parents. Also, the impact on the quantity and quality of family 
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labor supply might affect the regional labor market and influence the level of wages, as 
assumed by Malthus, and could influence the structure of wages between young workers 
and adults or between men and women. 
It is widely observed that parents with fewer children devote more economic 
resources to each child, as often measured by their children’s health and survival and 
years of completed schooling. The increase in the wage return to schooling in the 20th 
century has been attributed to the accumulation of complementary physical capital and to 
a skill bias in technical change that may motivate parents to increase their demands for 
child quality relative to child quantity. But there are as yet few empirical studies that 
account for the increase in schooling or health through exogenous increases in returns to 
human capital or through the decline in fertility.  
Estimating the causal effects of exogenous fertility variation on family lifetime 
behavior and outcomes is a challenge for assessing the policy implications of the 
demographic dividend. At the individual level, the two instruments used most commonly 
to induce exogenous variation in fertility are twins and the sex composition of initial 
births (Schultz 2008). Twins are interpreted as an exogenous shock to fertility before 
there are drugs to treat subfecundity. But twins are not identical to singleton births, 
because twins have below average health endowments and birth spacing is altered for 
twins, an added burden on families, especially those that are credit constrained. The sex 
composition of initial births is even less useful as an instrument for estimating the 
consequences of exogenous variation in fertility, because in many low-income countries 
the estimated response arises because of the preference of some families for male 
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offspring, which may be associated with other unobserved characteristics of those 
families, and the differential costs per child incurred by families rearing boys and girls.  
A family planning and maternal and child health program implemented in a 
remote rural district of Bangladesh, Matlab Thana, was designed as a long-term social 
experiment. It was initiated in half of 141 villages that already had a reliable 
demographic surveillance system that registered all births, deaths, marriages, and 
population movements monthly. Under the family planning program outreach effort, 
begun in October 1977, female health workers contacted all married women of 
childbearing age every two weeks in their home, offering them various methods of birth 
control and, after 1982, a variety of additional maternal and child health services (Phillips 
and others 1982; Fauveau 1994). The program was maintained through 1996, when a 
household survey was conducted that could be linked to background census data 
collected in 1974 and 1982 for the 141 villages (Rahman and others 1999).  
No claim has been found that the villages were assigned randomly to the program 
and control areas. Program services were expected to influence behavior in neighboring 
villages, which they have, and these spillover effects could be reduced by clustering the 
program and control villages, as was done in Matlab. This regional cluster design also 
probably reduced the administrative and transportation costs of the program.  
To assess whether the program and control areas differed before the program 
started, ratios of children ages 0–4 to women ages 15–49 from 1974 census data were 
compared in program and control villages, and this indicator of surviving fertility did not 
differ significantly between the two types of villages. By the 1982 census, the surviving 
fertility levels were 16 percent lower in the program villages, according to a double-
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differenced population-weighted regression, and this difference remained 15 percent 
lower in the program than in the control villages after 19 years as shown in the 1996 
follow up survey (Joshi and Schultz 2007; Moulton 1986). 
Population growth was more rapid in the control than in the program villages, but 
monthly wage rates did not differ significantly between the two village groups in 1996 
for males or females ages 15–24 or for men ages 25–54. But for women ages 25–54, who 
in the program villages tended to have significantly fewer children by 1996, the monthly 
wage rates were 40 percent higher than in the control villages, though the participation of 
adult women in wage employment declined relatively in program villages. Thus, the 
aggregate effects of population growth on wage rates that Malthus expected, because of 
diminishing returns to labor, are not evident in Matlab, whereas women who appear to 
have avoided unwanted and ill-timed births seem to have increased their productivity in 
the wage labor force (Schultz 2009). The Matlab family planning program can thus be 
viewed as a female-specific human capital investment program, raising adult women’s 
wages about as much as would three years of additional schooling (Schultz 2009). 
Other differences between the program and control villages confirm the tendency 
of the family planning and maternal and child health program in Matlab to be associated 
with increased schooling of children, measured by a Z score normalized for age by sex. 
The nutritional health status of children, summarized by their body mass index Z score, is 
significantly better for girls ages 1–11 in the program villages and for women ages 25–54 
(Joshi and Schultz 2007). 
Parents in program areas reported 25 percent more lifetime assets by 1996 per 
adult residing in the household than did parents in control areas. This pattern is consistent 
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with parents treating physical assets as a substitute for children. The composition of 
household assets also differs between program and control villages. Parents in program 
villages reduced their value of livestock more rapidly than did parents in the control 
villages, presumably because child labor is a critical input in caring for livestock. On the 
other hand, households in program villages had 33 percent or more asset values than did 
control households in financial assets, ponds and orchards, homesteads, agricultural 
equipment, buildings and shops, jewelry, and consumer durables (Schultz 2009). The 
program-associated increases in women’s wages, physical assets, and human capital are 
all expected to contribute to the economic development of villages in Matlab. 
V.  HOUSEHOLD CREDIT, HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION, AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
What can governments do to ensure that households are equipped to turn the 
decline in fertility into an economic dividend? In Matlab, the resulting household benefits 
do not appear to be due to the aggregate effects on the general wage labor market of the 
program’s slowing of population growth. The program benefits of improved control of 
reproduction are associated with households reallocating their time and financial 
resources as they reduce family size, realize health and productivity gains that are 
concentrated among women and children, and accumulate nonhuman capital to drive 
economic development. 
If the returns to human capital rise, due perhaps to technical change in the world 
that complements the skills of more educated workers in production, parents with 
physical assets that are accepted as collateral, such as land, are in a more favorable 
position to respond to these new opportunities and borrow to invest more in the schooling 
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of their children. Underinvestment in human capital by poor people may then occur, and 
public policies are needed to facilitate the schooling of children in poor households to 
prevent a widening gap in schooling between landed and landless classes. A variety of 
policy responses are discussed in the development literature: expanding local access to 
schooling, monitoring the quality of schools and making teachers more accountable to 
local parents in poor areas, providing fellowships for able students whose parents are 
relatively poorly educated and lack collateral to finance their children’s schooling, and 
targeting cash transfers to poor mothers conditional on their children’s enrollment and 
advancement in school.  
Encouraging financial institutions to make loans to poorer parents may require 
subsidies and close monitoring to document that the loans reach the intended group and 
have the anticipated consequences on family resource allocation. An institutional 
alternative is joint lending to neighborhood groups or social networks, such as the 
prototypical Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, which is said to rely on social network 
pressures within a group of borrowers to substitute for the incentive effects provided by 
normal collateral to enforce loan repayment. Women often lack collateral because of their 
culturally weak property rights in the family, and women are consequently a prime 
beneficiary of some microcredit institutional innovations. These institutions could 
arguably solve the problem of market failure for poor women who do not currently have 
access to the formal financial sector (Aghion and Morduch 2005). 
But microcredit programs oriented toward poor women may still embody biases 
among types of investment activities and occupational careers that might discourage 
women from some favorable long-run choices. Physical capital investments may be 
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favored over human capital investments. Self-employment of women may be favored 
over investments to enter the wage sector. Outputs from traditional home production 
activities may be less profitable in the long run than other types of off-farm production 
and employment. Self-employment activities might increase the marginal productivity of 
child labor and thus deter parents from investing more in the schooling and migration of 
their children. And most self-employed women work in productive activities at their 
home, which increases the likelihood that they can combine their work with their 
traditional responsibilities for child care, thereby lowering the opportunity cost of 
additional children and favoring larger family sizes, other things equal. Fertility may thus 
be increased by microcredit schemes targeted to poor women. If women reallocate their 
productive efforts outside their home and enter into wage employment, their lifetime 
productivity may increase as well as the human capital of their children.  
Reorienting microcredit programs to facilitate women’s transition to wage work 
should reduce a built-in bias of many programs that are oriented toward supporting self-
employment for women in the home. Microcredit might be designed to help parents 
support the temporary or permanent migration of their daughters and sons to improve 
their adult employment opportunities, with remittances from the children to their parents 
helping to repay the loans, motivating parents and daughters to delay marriage and 
increasing daughters’ influence in the choice of a mate as they become more 
economically empowered. Outmigration of children from poor rural areas might also 
encourage parents to first send their children to school for a longer period when urban 
jobs reward better educated workers more than do most manual rural jobs. 
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Finally, the products produced by participants in these microcredit programs for 
women might not represent the most promising lifetime opportunities. Traditional 
handicrafts (baskets, textiles, ceramics, and wood working) might not be commodities for 
which domestic demand is especially price and income elastic. Livestock, which are 
often acquired by women with the aid of microcredit programs, might increase the 
household’s demand for child labor and thus discourage children’s school attendance or 
outmigration. As noted earlier, these developments would reduce a woman’s opportunity 
cost of having more children and could thereby sustain higher fertility. One evaluation of 
the consequences of microcredit in Bangladesh finds that after controlling for the 
heterogeneity of women who take loans from the village microcredit system, the program 
increased women’s self-employment earnings, but the women were also more likely to 
then have additional births (Pitt and Khandkar 1998).  
VI. LABOR MARKET REFORMS, REGULATIONS, AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR 
WOMEN 
Labor market regulations often restrict employment opportunities for low-wage 
groups, including women. How are these regulations modified so as to help rural women 
enter the wage labor force as their fertility declines? Evidence is accumulating, 
particularly from Latin America, that formal labor market regulations intended to raise 
wages, increase fringe benefits, fund social welfare programs, and increase job security 
for workers through employment regulations have one thing in common (Heckman and 
Pages 2004; Schultz 2000): they reduce employment opportunities for members of 
disadvantaged groups, who typically receive below average wages, presumably because 
they are less productive than the average formal sector worker. This includes 
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inexperienced female entrants to the wage labor force, but also disadvantaged minority 
racial groups, such as indigenous groups in Latin America, lower castes in India, and 
remote ethnic and tribal groups in many regions. Mandatory regulations such as 
minimum wages and employee benefits may improve conditions for those who retain 
their jobs, if employers cannot shift their cost to workers, but labor market regulations 
tend also to exclude the less productive workers from entry-level jobs that might enable 
them to qualify over time for better jobs through on-the-job training (Mincer 1976).  
Raising minimum wages reduces employment proportionately and lowers labor 
force participation rates among low-wage groups (Maloney and Nuñez 2002). In some 
provinces of Canada, for example, extending fringe benefits to women in the form of 
maternity leave reduced women’s wage rates relative to men’s and reduced the share of 
female employment in the provinces that added maternity leave (Gruber 1994). Where 
minimum wages are binding and coverage is enforced, it is anticipated that formal sector 
employment will be reduced among the less productive groups whose current output does 
not exceed what employers must pay for labor. Especially in South Asia and Africa, 
where schooling is substantially less for adult women than men, minimum wage 
regulations reduce women’s employment opportunities in entry-level jobs (Bell 1997; 
Revenge 1997; Gruber 1997; Heckman and Pages 2004; Schultz 1988).  
Labor market reform appears to be difficult to achieve directly, because of the 
political strength of vested interests, including unions, in maintaining the status quo. 
These restrictions in the labor market that restrain women’s entry into the formal sector 
have, however, been indirectly eroded in some countries through lowering the barriers to 
international trade and encouraging foreign direct investment (Schultz 2000). Country 
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studies have also found that women’s employment is concentrated in export-oriented 
industries and that women’s share of jobs in these industries increases as barriers to trade 
fall (see, for example, Ravenga 1997; Hanson 2003; and Ozler 2000).  
Nonetheless, even when employment growth is rapid, as in the Middle East and 
North Africa since 2000, and barriers to trade and capital mobility are reduced, 
unemployment rates for women have risen relative to those for men, and this unutilized 
supply of women’s labor is larger in many countries in the region for better educated 
women (Nabli, Fauregui, and de Silva 2007). The decline in public sector employment 
may encourage more efficient labor allocation, but in some economies, such as Egypt 
before 1990, the public sector is a major employer of educated women. Reducing wages 
in this protected public sector could lower women’s wages but thereby expand women’s 
employment opportunities going forward and increase the benefit-cost ratio in the public 
sector provision of schooling and health services, delivered mainly by female employees. 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
Following the demographic transition, the growth in the labor force and the 
increase in per capita productivity tend to be associated with the increase in women’s 
labor force participation rates. With a microeconomic model of family labor supply that 
accounts for women’s time allocation and their productivity in the wage sector, it should 
be possible to answer more generally the question that motivated this article. How do 
policies that affect the decline in fertility contribute to development through the increase 
in household income and to the accumulation of household human and physical capital? 
Changes in women’s labor supply and household savings, in both human and physical 
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capital, are major sources of per capita economic growth that may plausibly be linked to 
the demographic transition. With the growing availability of household panel survey 
data, microeconometric models of family labor supply, fertility, and consumption 
behavior could be estimated. The fertility transition could then be accounted for within a 
simultaneous equation behavioral model rather than by analyzing household consumption 
while treating fertility and family composition as though they were exogenous “control” 
variables.  
Because the productive opportunities of people not in wage employment are not 
observed, inferring the average productivity of all men and women requires a model that 
accounts for who participates in the wage sector, as well as the productive characteristics 
of individuals, such as their human capital and other resources (Heckman 1974a,b; 
Schultz 2009). Identifying such a sample selection model requires a variable that affects 
the individual’s productivity of time in nonwage work or leisure but that is uncorrelated 
with the unobservable determinants of the market wage. The rural family’s ownership of 
agricultural land is a possible exclusion restriction that is expected to raise labor 
productivity in home production and self-employment and increase the value of leisure, 
thereby reducing the likelihood that a wife, her husband, or their children will work 
outside the household for a wage (Schultz 2009). But land could also be correlated with 
unobserved factors such as ability, motivation, and family connections that might affect 
market wages. 
This empirical approach underlies the findings on the Matlab district of 
Bangladesh, summarized above, that gains in productivity due to a program-induced 
decrease in fertility and slowing of population growth appear to have promoted 
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development. No relative gain in wages of male or female workers ages 15–24 is detected 
in the villages where a family planning social experiment has reduced fertility and 
population growth for two decades, challenging a premise of the Malthusian framework. 
However, older women in the program villages, ages 25–54, who have reduced their 
childbearing, are observed to receive much higher wages than women in the control 
villages, holding constant for schooling and age. This empirical finding in Matlab 
confirms the hypothesis that an effective family planning and reproductive health 
program can enhance women’s human capital and productivity. But the program effects 
on the time allocation of women benefiting from their avoidance of unwanted 
childbearing is difficult to predict a priori. In the Matlab case, women ages 25–54 work 
less in wage employment in the villages served by the program than in the comparison 
villages (Schultz 2009).  
Microcredit institutions in many parts of the world have provided financial 
assistance for poor women seeking to enter the labor force as self-employed workers. 
Conditional cash transfers have also been widely adopted in Bangladesh and countries in 
Latin America as a public institutional mechanism to encourage poor mothers to invest in 
the schooling of their children, while also minimizing the leakages common in traditional 
transfer programs as a result of political corruption. It may be productive to reorient these 
microcredit institutions to also encourage poor families to invest in the human capital of 
their children as well as to provide loans to cover the costs of mothers entering the formal 
wage labor market. Changing the orientation of microcredit institutions from a focus on 
the self-employment of women in home-based cottage industries to one that also 
facilitates family human capital investments, migration, and wage work by women could 
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extend and strengthen the benefits of microcredit for poor women and their children, 
especially following the demographic transition.  
Reducing labor market regulations, such as minimum wages and mandatory 
benefits for workers in covered sectors, is one way to diminish the barriers to women’s 
access to low-wage entry jobs that can enable them to improve their productivity through 
on-the-job experience and learning. Middle-age women are often denied employment 
because of a lack of experience. Unions understandably defend the employment benefits 
and prerogatives of the segment of the middle class they represent in low-income 
countries. In the public sector, unions can reduce the accountability and efficiency of the 
workforce assigned to produce essential public services in education and health care. In 
such cases, lowering wages for women entering the labor force or allowing more 
competitive entry of “uncertified” teaching assistants and auxiliary health workers in the 
public sector could reduce insider rents. But all stake holders in the public sector might 
not support such reforms. (Banerjee and others 2007).  
Few governments directly intervene to reduce the influence of labor unions over 
conditions of employment. However, dismantling barriers to international trade and 
capital mobility is sometimes associated with favorable labor market trends and with 
conditions that increase schooling and longevity, especially for women (Schultz 2000, 
2006). The balancing of politically organized pressure groups has recently achieved more 
traction in liberalizing controls on international trade than has any similar effort to reduce 
regulations in the labor market. Successful labor market reforms are uncommon perhaps 
because the groups that benefit from deregulation tend to be less concentrated, such as 
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women, and thus less likely to be organized or empowered within the political system to 
promote the reforms.  
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